Understanding \u3ci\u3eMahon\u3c/i\u3e in Historical Context by Treanor, William Michael
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1998 
Understanding Mahon in Historical Context 
William Michael Treanor 
Georgetown University Law Center, wtreanor@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1039 
 
86 Geo. L.J. 933-943 (1998) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Economics 
Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
HeinOnline  -- 86 Geo. L.J. 933 1997-1998
Understanding Mahon in Historical Context 
WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANOR* 
Holmes's judicial opinions are, far too frequently, better art than law. We 
remember his elegant phrases. We admire his brilliant rhetoric. We applaud his 
creativity and insight. But, when we try to determine the precise rule of law 
embodied in his decisions, we struggle, because Holmes's analyses are brief, 
cryptic, and incompletely developed. 
Despite its enormous influence on constitutional law, Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon 1 is just such an opinion; the primary purpose of my article Jam for 
Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon2 is to clarify Holmes's 
intent by placing the opinion in historical context and in the context of Holmes's 
other opinions. While other scholars have also sought to place Mahon in 
context, my account differs in large part because of its recognition, as part of the 
background of Mahon, of a separate line of cases involving businesses affected 
with a public interest. 
I argue that at the time Holmes wrote Mahon, cases involving businesses 
affected with a public interest were the only ones in which the constitutionality 
of regulations turned on the effect those regulations had on property values. 
Previous scholars have either overlooked these cases altogether or collapsed 
them in with other substantive due process cases without recognizing their 
analytic distinctiveness. The consistent treatment of Mahon as a conservative 
decision follows. Mahon is sometimes seen as a case that supplemented substan-
tive due process by giving judges a new tool to invalidate statutes; under this 
view, as a result of Mahon, regulations could, for the first time, be overturned 
because they diminished value too greatly.3 Alternately, Mahon is seen as a 
Lochner-type case, reaffirming the principle that regulations that diminish value 
were unconstitutional as previously recognized by that line of cases.4 
Because they either fail to see that there were some cases before Mahon 
involving regulations in which the effect on value was deemed relevant to the 
regulation's constitutionality or fail to see that these cases all involved busi-
nesses affected with a public interest, these scholars have missed the aspect of 
Mahon that is critical to understanding it: In evaluating the constitutionality of 
the Kohler Act, Holmes was treating diminution in value as relevant, even 
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. J.D., Yale, 1985; A.M. (History), 
Harvard, 1981; B.A., Yale, 1979. I thank Howard Shapiro for his suggestions. I also thank The 
Georgetown Law Journal for this opportunity to reply. Finally, I thank Richard Epstein and Robert 
Brauneis for their thoughtful responses to my primary article. 
I. 260 u.s. 393 (1922). 
2. William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 
GEO. L.J. 813 (1998). 
3. See id. at Part IIA. 
4. See id. at Part liB. 
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though the business involved was not one affected with a public interest. In so 
doing, Holmes was sharply breaking from the traditional categorical rules used 
by the Court. In place of those rules, he was employing a balancing test that was 
strongly weighted in favor of the government-a balancing test in which 
diminution in value was the factor on the property owner's side of the balance. 
The precise nature of that balancing test-and specifically the fact that it ·was 
weighted in favor of the government-is not obvious from reading Mahon 
alone. But when Mahon is placed in the context of the full range of Holmes's 
opinions concerning regulations or government actions that caused consequen-
tial damages, it becomes obvious that Holmes applied balancing tests and that 
the private property owner prevailed only when the government action was 
(from Holmes's perspective) arbitrary or when the government action was 
tantamount to an exercise of the eminent domain power. Despite the result in 
Mahon, the overall effect of this new test was to expand the realm of permis-
sible government action. 
Professors Richard Epstein and Robert Brauneis have offered substantial and 
interesting critiques of my article. 5 Their responses have different focuses. 
While Professor Epstein contends that I overstate the extent to which Holmes 
favored deference to legislatures, his fundamental quarrel is with Holmes, not 
with me. Professor Brauneis, in contrast, is concerned with defending his 
previously-advanced thesis of the meaning of Mahon and its relation to prece-
dent.6 Despite these differences, the responses can be usefully paired. In this 
reply, I draw on Professor Epstein's articulation of pre-Mahon constitutional 
property jurisprudence to show precisely what Holmes rejected and why. I then 
build on this discussion to show why I reject Professor Brauneis's reading of 
Mahon. I conclude by discussing the significance of my thesis. 
I. REPLY TO PROFESSOR EPSTEIN 
Professor Epstein takes me to task for having "lost sight of [the] basic 
structure" 7 of the Supreme Court constitutional property caselaw that formed 
the backdrop to Mahon. In my article, I sought to identify the basic legal 
principles present in pre-Mahon caselaw, and admittedly did not focus on 
developing the intellectual underpinnings of that caselaw. Professor Epstein 
undertakes to do what I did not, and his discussion is illuminating. 
Epstein offers a libertarian justification of the caselaw. Libertarian theory, he 
posits, provides two8 reasons for regulating private behavior. First, government 
5. Robert Brauneis, Treanor's Mahon, 86 GEO. LJ. 907 (1998); Richard A. Epstein, Pennsylvania 
Coal v. Mahon: The Erratic Takings Jurisprudence of Justice Holmes, 86 GEO. L.J. 875 (1998). 
6. See Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": The Myth 
and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 618 
(1996). 
7. Epstein, supra note 5, at page 877. 
8. While Epstein acknowledges that there are more than two rationales, he concludes that only two 
bear on Mahon. See id. at 876 n.9. 
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may counter aggression. 9 Second, government may counter the risk of mo-
nopoly pricing.Io According to Epstein, the first principle underlay the Court's 
traditional police powers doctrine, the second its caselaw involving businesses 
affected with a public interest. II 
Epstein admirably explains much of the pre-Mahon caselaw, caselaw that 
might otherwise appear riddled with incomprehensible distinctions and atti-
tudes. Epstein's account, however, does not encompass two types of cases from 
Holmes's day (other than Holmes's decisions). One of those types includes 
those cases in which the business affected with a public interest doctrine was 
deemed applicable, not because of concern about monopoly, but because of, to 
quote Epstein, "the size and importance of the industry, or of the firms within 
it." 12 Epstein acknowledges the existence of these cases and recognizes that his 
explanation fails to account for them. 13 The second type of case includes those 
police power cases in which the Court upheld regulations aimed at promoting 
morality. Classically, police power cases could be justified as serving one of 
three ends: safety, health, or morality. The first two ends can be justified on 
libertarian grounds. The third is, at the very least, hard to square with libertarian-
ism, and Epstein noticeably does not discuss these cases. 
Both Epstein's account and its explanatory limits help explain why Holmes 
rejected constitutional orthodoxy. The incomplete nature of Epstein's account 
suggests, at a fairly obvious level, the incoherence of the precedent: while some 
of the leading decisions could be defended on libertarian grounds, others could 
not. So, in cases in which other Justices suggested (a la Epstein) that the Due 
Process Clause meant that only legislation concerned with preventing harm 
could pass muster, and that harm had to be narrowly understood, Holmes could 
respond by citing examples drawn from the morality wing of the police power 
caselaw. Lochner most prominently exemplifies this point. Holmes wrote: 
It is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state 
laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as 
injudicious, or if you like as tyrannical, as this [statute limiting the hours 
bakers could work], and which, equally with this, interfere with the liberty to 
contract. Sunday laws and usury laws are ancient examples. A more modem 
one is the prohibition of lotteries. 14 
Implicitly, Holmes challenged orthodox jurisprudence by asking: Why is promot-
ing morality a legitimate end, while promotion of some other end sanctioned by 
the majority is not? 
9. /d. at Part lB. 
10. /d. at Part I c. 
11. ld. at Part Io. 
12. /d. at 885. 
13. ld. 
14. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Thus, Holmes easily dismissed the constitutional property jurisprudence 
reflected in the Court's decisions because of its inconsistencies and incoheren-
cies. Suppose, instead, that Holmes confronted a constitutional property jurispru-
dence that embodied a coherent expression of libertarian philosophy-
specifically, a jurisprudence of the type outlined by Epstein-would he have 
embraced it? Again, the answer is no, and for two reasons. The first reason 
flows from Holmes's constitutional theory, and, as before, the classic statement 
of the relevant aspect of this theory appears in his Lochner dissent: "The 
[Fourteenth] Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Stat-
ics .... [A c]onstitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, 
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of 
laissez fa ire." 15 Holmes would have rejected Epstein's vision because Holmes 
did not understand the Constitution as implicitly incorporating libertarian theory. 
As the quote from the Lochner dissent indicates, Holmes saw no basis in the 
constitutional text or other legitimate source of constitutional authority for holding 
that government could regulate activity only in the interests of health or safety. 
The second difference between Holmes and Epstein is analytic. In discussing 
Mahon, Epstein accepts my view of Holmes as a balancer. 16 He adds that 
"balancing is always required in every legal context.'.r 7 This is not true, 
however. Legal analysis does not inevitably tum on balancing, as Epstein's own 
approach demonstrates. His proposed approach to takings law has two aspects: 
government can regulate to prevent aggression and to prevent an individual 
from reaping monopoly profits; if its regulation does not serve these ends, it 
must compensate individuals for any economic loss they suffer. Balancing 
enters neither aspect of this analysis. The same point is true of the pre-Mahon 
caselaw that falls outside Epstein's account. For example, with respect to the 
legislation justified as protecting morality, courts asked simply whether the 
legislation was truly aimed at promoting morality and whether the means 
employed were suited to that end. The inquiry did not involve balancing. As I 
seek to show in my article, all of the pre-Mahon caselaw employs such 
categorical rules. 
Epstein has a faith that Holmes lacked in the ability of legal reasoning to lead 
to determinate answers, and Holmes's lack of faith led him to reject traditional 
categorical rules and to defer to legislative judgments. It led Holmes, in 
particular, to reject traditional substantive due process jurisprudence (and it 
would have led him to reject Epstein's modified version of that jurisprudence). 
In place of that jurisprudence, Holmes employed a balancing test in which a 
crucial factor was the effect of the regulation on value. Perhaps because his 
approach is so different from Holmes's, Epstein misreads Mahon. Contrary to 
Epstein, Mahon does not reflect an "erratic takings jurisprudence." 18 Where 
15. /d. 
16. Epstein, supra note 5, at 896. 
17. /d. 
18. Id. at 875. 
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Epstein finds the opinion repeatedly "shifts ground" 19 and "veers,"20 Holmes's 
approach in the opinion largely reflects the balancer's recognition of the weight 
of the claims on both sides of the controversy. My claim is not that Mahon is a 
model of judicial craftsmanship. Written with characteristic Holmesian haste, it 
isn't. But, as I seek to show in my article, it reflects a consistent stance and an 
underlying theory. 
Epstein's view of Holmes as erratic is not simply a product of Epstein's 
reading of Mahon. It is, at another level, a product of what Epstein sees as the 
tension between the result in Mahon and Holmes's Lochner dissent.21 But, as 
my article seeks to show, focus on the result in Mahon obscures Holmes's 
underlying vision. The facts of the case bring it within an area where the 
Holmesian balancing approach leads to a result more favorable to the property-
owner than a traditional approach (at least as applied by a progressive tradi-
tional judge such as Brandeis). It should be added that I note one other case 
which featured such a seemingly anomalous result, Miller v. Horton. 22 Miller 
was the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case in which town officials 
ordered destruction of a horse to avoid the spread of glanders; the horse owner 
sought compensation when it was subsequently determined that the horse was 
healthy. Stretching the statute at issue in order to avoid constitutional problems, 
Holmes rules in the horse owner's favor. 23 Strikingly, as I read Epstein's 
response, he would have ruled in favor of the officials?4 Obviously, as a general 
matter Epstein's approach is more favorable to the property owner than Holmes's. 
Thus, Epstein's discussion of Miller supports one of my points about Mahon: as 
he rejected the existing tests, Holmes fashioned a new rule that despite its 
overall thrust was, in a limited range of situations, better for property owners 
than the traditional approach. 
In sum, Epstein's response helps highlight how and why Holmes departed 
from traditional substantive due process jurisprudence. Holmes rejected that 
jurisprudence because it was incoherent, because it was (in large part) libertar-
ian, and because it employed a formalist analytic approach that rested on a view 
of legal reasoning which conflicted with his own. 
II. REPLY TO PROFESSOR BRAUNEIS 
In his 1996 article on Mahon, Professor Brauneis advanced the thesis that, 
while Holmes's opinion departed from substantive due process orthodoxy in 
19. /d. at 895. 
20. /d. at 901. 
21. See id. at 888. 
22. 152 Mass. 540 (1891). For my discussion of this case, see Treanor, supra note 2, at 842-43. 
23. See Miller, 152 Mass. at 547-48. For further discussion, see Treanor, supra note 2, at 842-43. 
24. See Epstein, supra note 5, at 880-82. Epstein's discussion of the case does not include any 
statement about how it should have been resolved, but the test he sets forth-regulations that fall within 
the police power are valid unless their is invidious motive or selective application-would seemingly 
lead to a ruling in favor of the officials. 
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certain limited ways, it was fundamentally consistent with that caselaw. For 
example, he wrote: 
Holmes and the 1922 Court ... rather than viewing Mahon as a seminal case 
. . . understood the decision as one among many that incrementally estab-
lished the limits of the police power. Although Mahon was part of a trend 
toward accepting that the constitutionality of nontrespassory regulations could 
tum on the provision of compensation, it was not the first case to so hold?5 
In contrast, I, as the discussion in the previous section shows, view Mahon as a 
radical departure. A critical difference between my article and Professor Brau-
neis's is that I see Holmes's concern with value as innovative because effect on 
value had not been deemed a factor in traditional police power cases. Brauneis, 
on the other hand, did not treat the businesses-affected-with-a-public-interest 
cases as a distinct line and consequently he simply saw Mahon as one of a 
number of cases from the era to treat value as a factor relevant to constitutional-
ity. In his article, Mahon is a substantive due process case "differently only in 
degree" from Lochner.26 
In the introduction to his response, Brauneis downplays the differences 
between our articles. He notes that both his article and mine claim to offer a 
new understanding of Mahon, but adds that "neither articles delivers transfigura-
tion."27 "[S]tripped of the bright plumage spred to court publication," he 
writes, "the articles reveal that Treanor and I have substantial areas of agree-
ment regarding Holmes's general approach to constitutional law, deference to 
legislatures, the textual basis of Mahon and Mahon's reputation." 28 I strongly 
disagree with the suggestion that my claim is overstated. (Professor Brauneis is 
free to characterize his own contribution as he wishes.) Mahon is a very 
different case if it is understood, not as one of the cases that "incrementally 
established the limits of the police power" 29 during an era of extensive judicial 
oversight of economic legislation, but as a case that fundamentally rejected all 
of the elements of the period's conservative jurisprudence. Mahon is, for 
Brauneis, Lochner-lite. For me, it is of a piece with Holmes's Lochner dissent. 
One of the principal differences between my article and Brauneis's concerns 
Mahon's reputation in the years between 1935 and 1958. Brauneis writes that, 
after 1935, "Mahon appeared to be destined for oblivion .... " 30 I argue, in 
contrast, that the case was well-remembered during this period-in particular, 
because of the split between Holmes and Brandeis.31 Nonetheless, "it was, at 
25. Brauneis, supra note 6, at 666. 
26. /d. at 676. 
27. Brauneis, supra note 5, at 907. 
28. /d. 
29. Brauneis, supra note 6, at 666. 
30. /d. at 680. 
31. See Treanor, supra note 2, at 861-62 (immediate reaction to case); id. at 864 (pre-1958 
prominence of the case). 
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first, an uninfluential case, in the sense of affecting Supreme Court decisions." 32 
Brauneis's response fails to recognize my point here. He writes, "I will be 
happy to concede Mahon's prominence, ... if Treanor will concede that the 
prominence was completely unrelated to any sense that Mahon represented a 
doctrinal innovation." 33 Similarly, he concludes with a challenge: "If, as one 
last concession, Treanor will agree that, between 1935 and 1958, Mahon 
remained in memory almost entirely as a Holmes case, ... , then I will be 
content and put down my pen." 34 No concession is necessary. It is precisely my 
claim that Holmes's contemporaries failed to see ilie doctrinal innovation 
underlying Mahon and Holmes's other constitutional property cases: "Given the 
novelty of [Holmes's] approach and the opaqueness of his presentation, it is 
easy to see why his contemporaries failed to see what he was doing and failed to 
follow him." 35 
In contrast, Brauneis and I do disagree about whether the Contract Clause 
was (alongside the Due Process Clause) one basis for the decision in Mahon. He 
believes it was; I believe it wasn't. It should be added that this is not a 
significant part of my argument; while Brauneis offers an extensive rebuttal of 
my position, 36 my discussion of the Contract Clause is limited to a footnote, 37 
and my argument in the article in no way turns on whether the Contract Clause 
was an alternative basis to the decision in Mahon. The issue as to the role the 
Contract Clause plays in the decision turns simply on how one parses the text. 
Brauneis points out that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions discuss the 
Contract Clause issue, 38 that the briefs in the case also discussed the issue, 39 
and that Frankfurter in the appendix to his law review article on Holmes's 
constitutional opinions listed it as a Contract Clause case.40 He's right. Nonethe-
less, examination of the one direct reference to the Contract Clause in the 
opinion and the other references to contract that Holmes makes shows that the 
Contract Clause is never actually the basis for the decision.41 
By stressing the continuities between Mahon and the caselaw that preceded 
it, Brauneis's article reinforces a view of the case that I believe is fundamentally 
inaccurate. I also believe that that understanding of Mahon has had a deleterious 
effect on modem takings jurisprudence. I will return to these points, but want to 
address briefly some of the more specific points Brauneis raises. 
32. /d. at 862. 
33. Brauneis, supra note 5, at 930. 
34. /d. at 932. 
35. Treanor, supra note 2, at 862. 
36. Brauneis, supra note 5, at 924-26. 
37. Treanor, supra note 2, at 828 n.88. 
38. Brauneis, supra note 5, at 925 & n.l03. 
39. /d. at 925 & n.l07. 
40. /d. at 926 & n.108. For the article, see Felix Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes's 
Constitutional Opinions, 36 HARv. L. REv. 909, 937 (1923). 
41. The relevant references are provided in Brauneis, supra note 5, at 925. I leave the proof to the 
reader. 
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Brauneis devotes much of his response to critiquing my claim that the two 
sets of circumstances in which Holmes believed government actions affecting 
property rights were unconstitutional were those in which government acted to 
benefit itself or in which no public interest was served by the government 
action. Part of his argument here is evidentiary. In particular, with respect to the 
first set of circumstances, Brauneis discounts my reading of Holmes's letter to 
Frankfurter about Mahon, a source he did not draw on in his article, and argues 
that the parallel passage in Holmes's letter to Pollack about the case better 
explains Holmes's theory.42 Presumably, however, Holmes would more care-
fully explain his legal doctrine in writing to Frankfurter than to Pollack, his 
letters to the latter being notorious for their incomplete legal discussion. As 
Professor Walton Hamilton observed of the Holmes-Pollack letters, "[Holmes] 
affords only passing glances [into his opinions], hardly ever enough for his 
English friend to know what the cause [was] about." 43 
With respect to the second set of circumstances, Brauneis agrees that these 
were cases in which Holmes believed compensation was owed, but he argues 
that underlying Holmes's approach was not utilitarianism, but justice-based 
concerns.44 Part of Brauneis's argument is simply that this is not an approach a 
utilitarian would favor. In fact, however, it can be squared with utilitarianism, 
although utilitarianism combined with the limited faith in judicial decisionmak-
ing characteristic of Holmes. 
One of the standard defenses of a compensation requirement is utilitarian. 
Such a requirement forces the state to determine whether the benefits of a taking 
outweigh the costs. In the absence of such a requirement, the state would have 
an incentive to take, because the property could be acquired for free. With a 
compensation requirement, however, the state will take only if the benefits it 
derives outweigh its costs.45 Holmes's opinions reflect the view that, while 
legislative determinations generally should stand, deference stops at the point of· 
simple transfers from one person to another or when the government uses the 
property to benefit itself. In other words, though a court normally should allow 
the legislature to weigh competing interests, there comes a point when even a 
deferential court will assume that the legislature erred in its utilitarian calculus, 
and beyond that point the court will mandate compensation. 
The other part of my disagreement with Brauneis about why Holmes favored 
compensation in this set of circumstances grows out of the fact that he and I 
read Holmes differently. In his constitutional property decisions, Holmes repeat-
edly employed two rhetorical moves. He typically employed the language of 
42. See id. at 913-14. For the relevant part of my article, see Treanor, supra note 2, at 853, 859-60 & 
n.275. 
43. Walton H. Hamilton, On Dating Mr. Justice Holmes, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 25 (1941). 
44. See Brauneis, supra note 5, at 914-20. 
45. Professor Epstein, for example, advances such a justification in his response. See Epstein, supra 
note 5, at 896-97. 
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balancing, as Brauneis acknowledges.46 This is the language on which I focus. 
At the same time, Holmes typically also used the language on which Brauneis 
focuses when he claims that "Holmes was centrally concerned with assessing 
degrees of change from principles (or 'structural habits') embedded in positive 
law .... " 47 Thus, Holmes employed language that suggests that courts are 
involved in careful analysis of the precedent concerning what types of regula-
tion are permissible and careful consideration of individual circumstance. For 
example, in Mahon, Holmes writes: 
[A] strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to 
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of 
paying for the change. As we already have said, this is a question of 
degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. But we 
regard this as going beyond any of the cases decided by this Court. The late 
decisions upon laws dealing with the congestion of Washington and New 
York, caused by the war, dealt with laws intended to meet a temporary 
emergency and providing for compensation determined to be reasonable by an 
impartial board. They went to the verge of the law but fell far short of the 
present act. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. 
Feldman, 256 U.S. 170. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242.48 
The real question is: Which of the two types of language actually reflects 
Holmes's approach and which is primarily rhetoric? Brauneis finds in Holmes's 
opinions attention to structural habits. I find in these opinions, however, a 
consistent lack of careful attention to the facts of the precedent and to the 
principles they might embody. As the quoted language from Mahon evidences, 
there is simply citation to precedent, cursory summary, and invocation of the 
principle that everything is a question of degree. Examination of the results in 
the Holmes body of decisions suggests that Holmes was guided by the govern-
ment-weighted balancing test I outline, rather than the complicated calculus 
Brauneis develops. "Results," Brauneis writes at one point in his response, "are 
indispensable reality checks for verbal formulae .... " 49 I agree. The outcomes 
Holmes reaches reflect the rules I describe. 
Finally, Brauneis acknowledges as significant my discussion of the businesses-
affected-with-a-public-interest case law: "Mahon's innovation may have been 
the principled expansion of just compensation analysis beyond the 'affected 
witli a public interest' category." 50 While Brauneis does not develop why 
46. Brauneis, supra note 5, at 917 ("To be sure, we can find language in Holmes opinions suggestive 
of cost-benefit analysis."). 
47. /d. at 909. 
48. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416. 
49. Brauneis, supra note 5, at 921. 
50. /d. at 928. Brauneis does not completely accept my thesis here, because he says that there are 
"isolated cases" outside the "affected with a public interest" category in which government acts were 
invalidated for lack of compensation. See id. at n.l23 (citing Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911) 
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it is significant that Mahon was "innovative" in this fashion, I would like to do 
so here because consideration of this point shows why Mahon was not a case 
that "incrementally established the limits of the police power," 51 but rather a 
case that reflected a fundamentally different approach to constitutional property 
law. In Mahon, Holmes does not treat the safety concern addressed by the 
Kohler Act as having any weight. He does not treat the coal industry as a 
business affected with a public interest. Under the case law at the time, that 
should have been the end of the inquiry; the statute should have been held 
unconstitutional without further ado. Because Mahon embodies the view, as I 
think it unquestionably does, that the Kohler Act would have been constitutional 
if it had not diminished value so greatly, Mahon reflects a dramatically new 
approach to government regulation. Examination of progressive legal scholar-
ship can help clarify this point. Seeking to expand the realm of permissible 
government regulation beyond traditional police power ends, liberal scholars in 
the 1920s and 1930s argued that, in reality, all businesses were businesses 
affected with a public interest and all businesses could thus be subject to 
extensive government regulation. For example, in his classic article, For Whom 
Are Corporate Managers Trustees ?,52 Professor E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., wrote: 
Despite certain recent conservative decisions ... , it may well be that law is 
approaching a point of view which will regard all business as affected with a 
public interest. If certain businesses then continue to be allowed unregulated 
profits, it will be because the lawmakers regard the competitive conditions 
under which such businesses are carried on as making regulation of profits 
unnecessary, and not because the owners of such enterprises have any constitu-
tional right to have their property treated as private in the sense which 
property held merely for private use is private. 53 
In other words, Dodd and other scholars took the view that the police power had 
to be dramatically expanded; so long as government regulation of business 
pursued a broadly understood conception of the public good and so long as it 
did not diminish the value of property too greatly, it should be deemed constitu-
tional. 54 
What no one saw was that Holmes in Mahon and his other constitutional 
property decisions had already adopted essentially this same position. But his 
and caselaw discussed in Brauneis, supra note 6, at 672 n.270, 673-75). The cases Brauneis mentions, 
however, are best understood as involving physical interference with property, another traditional 
category. Mahon remains innovative, except for dicta in Holmes's opinions. 
51. Brauneis, supra note 6, at 666. 
52. 40 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932). 
53. /d. at 1149 (emphasis added). 
54. For other articles advancing such arguments, see Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision 
of the Property Concept, COLUM. L. REv. 209 (1922); Walton Hamilton, Affectation with a Public 
Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930). See also Treanor, supra note 2, at 866 & n.308 (discussing this 
scholarship). 
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intent was not understood and liberals, as a result, did not tum to Mahon for 
support. As the responses of Professors Epstein and Brauneis illustrate, that 
misunderstanding of the case has continued. It is ironic that a dec~sion that 
embodied a view that courts should defer to majoritarian decisionmaking has 
become the case on which the takings revival has placed primary reliance. As I 
argue in my article, that misreading is also profoundly unfortunate, because it 
has led to an inappropriately broad reading of the Takings Clause. 55 At the end 
of my article, I applauded Mahon as an "intellectual tour de force. " 56 Along 
similar lines, at the beginning of this response, I suggested that Mahon was 
great art. But, in evaluating Mahon, it is important to recognize as well 
that Holmes's fondness for aphorisms rather than careful articulation of his 
legal analysis has imposed serious costs. To paraphrase Holmes, great art, like 
hard cases, makes bad law.57 • 
55. Treanor, supra note 2, at 871-74. 
56. For my discussion of the merits of Holmes's approach, see Treanor, supra note 2, at 874. 
57. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Great 
cases, like hard cases, make bad law"). 
